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1 Introduction
The misallocation of capital is widely thought to contribute underdevelopment and pro-
duction ine¢ ciencies (Banerjee and Duo, 2005, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Recent micro-
evidence has documented the ine¢ cient ow of capital within developing countries. For
instance, de Mel, Woodru¤ and Mckenzie (2009) and Paulson,Townsend and Karaivanov
(2006) nd that nance does not ow to high return entrepreneurs in Sri Lanka and Thai-
land respectively. Banerjee and Munshi (2004) suggest that nance does not ow across
ethnic lines in India.
In this paper we investigate the ows of capital across space. We nd large and signif-
icant di¤erences in the returns to comparable nancial investments across location-specic
nancial markets in a southern Indian state. If nance owed to its highest use, such
di¤erences should not exist. The natural question then arises: Why doesnt arbitrage
borrowing from locations where nance is cheap and investing in locations where nance
is scarce eliminate these di¤erences? We nd that evidence of limited arbitrage by an
"insider" and suggest a reason why it is costly for non-insiders enter the arbitrage business.
Imagine for illustrative purposes that there are just two locations, L and H. Several
loan transactions take place in each location. Suppose that the average interest rates are
signicantly lower in location L than in locationH, even when controlling for any di¤erences
in the size, term, riskiness, contractual features of the loans between L and H: This suggests
nancial fragmentation: an ine¢ ciency in the allocation of capital over space. Location H
apparently has higher return projects than location L and capital should be owing from
L to H so as to equalize the average returns. If an arbitrageur were to borrow from L
and invest in H; he would make prots as long as the spread in interest rates was higher
than the costs of arbitrage. Note that a wedge between the borrowing and savings interest
rates will create such a transactions cost of arbitrage.
In the paper, we analyze data from 78 locations in the state of Tamil Nadu in south
India. We use data from a non-bank nancial intermediary that organizes auctions in
di¤erent locations to intermediate between borrowers and savers in that location. There
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are two advantages of this dataset. First, interest rate in each location are determined
by auction and so should reect local productivity shocks. In contrast, commerical bank
interest rates are determined centrally in India and hence are identical across locations.
Secondly, since loan contracts are standardized and explicit across locations and we can
compare interest rates while adjusting for di¤erences in loan characteristics. In contrast,
the spatial variation in interest rates on informal loans by moneylender observed elsewhere
could have arisen because of unobserved variation in contractual terms or riskiness (Banerjee
and Duo, 2005):
We nd evidence of nancial fragmentation across the 78 locations. Put di¤erently,
the interest rates across locations are signicantly and substantially di¤erent from each
other even when controlling for loan characteristics (such as the length and amount of the
loan, the collateral required) and riskiness (as measured by ex-post default rates). The
annual interest rates on savings range from 6:56 percent to 12:63 percent Remarkably,
fragmentation occurs even though the company is engaged in arbitrage across locations.
The company participates in about a third of the loan transactions and systematically
borrows when interest rates are low and saves when they are high. We think of this as a
form of insider arbitrage and nd that the companys behavior suggests that it has an
investment opportunity with higher return than the average of the 78 locations it operates
in. While our model suggests that e¢ ciency would be lower (nancial fragmentation
greater) in the absence of insider arbitrage, we have cannot test this claim because we have
no data on nancial fragmentation in the absence of an inside arbitrageur. Finally, we
provide some indirect evidence that the transactions costs associated with intermediation
can explain why there are no outside arbitrageurs. These transaction costs (a) limit the
interest-rate spread between locations and hence prevent nancial e¢ ciency and (b) allow
the insider to make monopoly prots from the interest-rate spreads.
Our paper forms a bridge, then, between the empirical research on nancial constraints
in development (cited above) and a literature on the limits to arbitrage in nancial markets
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). While much of the latter literature studies how risk aversion,
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transaction costs or agency di¢ culties can impede arbitrage, Borenstein et al (2008) explore
a similar market power explanation for price di¤erences despite arbitrage opportunities in
Californias electricity market. In their study, regulatory barriers prevent rms from
exploiting the arbitrage opportunities. In our paper, there are no regulatory di¤erences
across locations that would prevent arbitrage.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide background on bidding Roscas
in South India and on our dataset. In Section 3 we outline some of the testable implications
from a simple model. We discuss our results in Section 4:
2 Institutional Background
This study uses data on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (commonly referred to
as Roscas). Roscas intermediate between borrowers and savers but do so quite di¤erently
from banks (Anderson and Baland, 2003; Besley, Coate and Loury, 1994). In this section
we provide some background on how the Roscas in our study operate. We also describe
the sample of Rosca participants that we will use in our subsequent empirical analysis.
Rules
Roscas are nancial institutions in which the accumulated savings are rotated among par-
ticipants. Participants in a Rosca meet at regular intervals, contribute into a "pot" and
rotate the accumulated contributions. So there are always as many Rosca members as
meetings. In random Roscas, the pot is allocated by lottery and in bidding Roscas the pot
is allocated by an auction at each meeting. Our study uses data on the latter.
More specically, the bidding Roscas in our sample work as follows. Each month
participants contribute a xed amount to a pot. They then bid to receive the pot in an
oral ascending bid auction where previous winners are not eligible to bid. The highest
bidder receives the pot of money less the winning bid and the winning bid is distributed
among all the members as an interest dividend. The winning bid can be thought of as the
4
price of capital. Consequently, higher winning bids mean higher interest payments. Over
time, the winning bid falls as the duration for which the loan is taken diminishes. In the
last month, there is no auction as only one Rosca participant is eligible to receive the pot.
We illustrate the rules with a numerical example:
Example (Bidding and Payo¤s) Consider a 3 person Rosca which meets once a month
and each participant contributes $10: The pot thus equals $30. Suppose the winning
bid is $12 in the rst month. Each participant receives a dividend of $4: The recip-
ient of the rst pot e¤ectively has a net gain of $12 (i.e. the pot less the bid plus the
dividend less the contribution, 30  12 + 4  10). Suppose that in the second month,
when there are 2 eligible bidders, the winning bid is $6: And in the nal month,
there is only one eligible bidder and so the winning bid is zero: The net gains and
contributions are depicted as:
Month 1 2 3
Winning bid 12 6 0
First Recipient 12 -8 -10
Second Recipient -6 16 -10
Last Recipient -6 -8 20
The rst recipient is a borrower: he receives $12 and repays $8 and $10 in subsequent
months, which implies a 30% monthly interest rate. The last recipient is a saver:
she saves $6 for 2 months and $8 for a month and receives $20, which implies a 28%
monthly rate. The intermediate recipient is partially a saver and partially a borrower.
The Sample
The bidding Roscas we study are large scale and organized commercially by a non-bank
nancial rm. The Rosca organizer is essentially the intermediary participants of a Rosca
either borrow (if they receive early pots) or save (if they win later pots), and the Rosca
organizer takes on the default risk of the borrowers. So much like a standard nancial
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intermediary, the Rosca organizer screens borrowers and secures loan repayments, so that
savers are assured of receiving funds in later rounds.
The data we use is from the internal records of an established Rosca organizer in the
southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.1 Our sample comprises Roscas that started on
or after January 1, 2002 and ended by November 2005: These Roscas took place in 78
branches of a non-bank nancial rm. Our sample comprises 2056 Roscas of 34 di¤erent
durations and contributions. The most common Rosca denomination had 25 participants
and a Rs. 400 monthly contribution (with a total pot of Rs. 10; 000). There were also
Roscas that met for longer durations (30 or 40 months) and with higher and lower monthly
contributions. The average duration of the Rosca in our sample was 29:55 months. These
di¤erent Rosca denominations serve to match borrowers and savers with di¤erent investment
horizons. Descriptive statistics of the Rosca denominations are in Table 1. Descriptive
statistics at the Rosca level are in Table 2.
For each Rosca in our sample, we compute the savings interest rate r as the solution to
T 1X
i=1
( m+ divi)(1 + r)T i + (Tm  c) = 0 (1)
where m is the individual monthly contribution, divt is the dividend in month t paid to
each participant, T is the number of rounds/months/participants, and c is commission to
the organizer in each round. The commission c is usually xed at ve percent of the value
of the pot, i.e. c = 0:05mT . According to the rules of these Roscas, div1 = divT = 0.





where bt is the winning bid in the round-t auction. Notice that the minimum winning bid
for t = 2; :::; T   1 is c. If none of the Rosca participants is willing to bid more than c in a
1Bidding Roscas are a signicant source of nance in South India, where they are called chit funds.
Deposits in regulated bidding Roscas were 12:5% of bank credit in the state of Tamil Nadu and 25% of bank
credit in the state of Kerala in the 1990s, and have been growing rapidly (Eeckhout and Munshi, 2004).
There is also a substantial unregulated chit fund sector.
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given auction, the round t recipient of the pot is determined through a lottery among the
eligible Rosca participants of that round. She receives the pot at a discount of precisely c.
The savers (last-round winners) in these Roscas are insured against winners of earlier
pots failing to make contributions by the organizer. Rather than asking for physical
collateral, the organizer requires auction winners to provide cosigners before releasing the
loans. Cosigners are required to be salaried employees with a minimum monthly income
that depends on the Rosca denomination. This is because the organizer has a legally
enforceable claim against their future income as collateral for the loan. The organizer may
also verify the auction winners income before releasing the loan. For instance, a self-
employed person will be asked for tax returns or bank statements while a salaried employee
will be asked for an earning record. Verication is a form of costly screening because it
takes time and e¤ort.
The only risk that the saver faces therefore is the risk that the organizer itself may go
bankrupt before the Rosca ends. This is indeed a real risk in the Indian context (where
numerous chit fund companies have folded), but it is common to all the savers in all the 78
branches in the sample.
The average annual interest rate for a saver in these Rosca is 9.17 percent per year with
a standard deviation of 1.18 percent. At each location, interest rates are determined locally
through auctions. In contrast, the commercial bank savings rates are determined centrally
and are not based on local supply and demand for credit. So there is no variation. We
have obtained the rates on 3-6 month xed deposits from the ICICI Bank, a large and well-
networked commercial bank, and those rates were at 6 percent or below for all of the study
period (2002-2005) with the exception of a six month period starting April 2002 when the
rate was 7.75 percent. The interest rates on commercial bank savings are substantially lower
than in the organized Rosca sector. This could reect a risk premium that the Rosca saver
must pay (since the organizer of the Roscas is more likely to go bankrupt than ICICI bank).
In addition, there is a uncertainty with the realized interest rate for a Rosca participant




In what follows we shall pay special attention to a particular investor who behaves quite
di¤erently from other Rosca participants. This investor operates in all 78 branches, and
takes several postions in Roscas in each branch. Further, this investor is not considered a
default risk by the Rosca organizer and so does not have to provide cosigners as collateral.
Field conversations and observations indicate that this investor has close business ties to
the Rosca organizer; for that reason it is not charged a commission for participation.
Other participants, by contrast, are location-specic, are charged a commission, and need
to provide cosigners when they win early pots. We shall interpret this investor as an
insider and use the term "the company" to refer to the single entity that comprises this
investor and the Rosca organizer in what follows.
3 A Model of Arbitrage in Roscas
In this section we consider a simple model of arbitrage between Roscas in two locations.
Our aim is to clarify how arbitrage can reduce reduce nancial ine¢ ciencies but also to
point out the incompleteness of such arbitrage when there are barriers to entry.
Consider two spatially separated locations, each with n private agents. Each agent is
endowed with a dollar in the rst period. Each agent has an investment opportunity with
a xed investment cost of 2 at date 1 and yield 2p at date 2: Agents do not discount the
future. Agents vary in their productivity p. In each location, agentstypes are distributed
according to Fi. For analytical convenience, we assume that each of the density functions
f1 and f2 is symmetric. Denote the corresponding mean and median by i. Without loss
of generality, we assume 1 > 2, i.e. agents in location 1 are on average more productive
than in location 2. The aggregate cumulative distribution function of types will be denoted
by F , where F (p) = 12 (F1(p) + F2(p)) : The mean of the aggregate distribution of types is
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 = (1 + 2)=2 and its median will be denoted by m: We assume private information on
individual types, i.e. each agent observes only her own type and knows the distribution of
types in her location.
In parts of the subsequent analysis, we employ the following additional assumptions:
A1 Fi is unimodal
A2 F2 is a translation of F1, i.e. F2(p) = F1(p+ 1   2)
We model simple Roscas with two participants and hence two rounds. There is an
auction only at date 1: Each Rosca participant contributes a dollar at date 1 and the
auction is for the repayment amount b that is due at date 2: The winner of the auction
receives the pot and invests. There is a xed commission of c charged for any net transfer
in a Rosca. As there are two net transfers in a Rosca, one in the rst and one in the
second period, the total commission is 2c: We assume that each of the two participants
pays a commission of c when the Rosca is over (for simplicity, c is not part of the winning
bid). So at date 2; the winner pays b to the loser of the rst-round auction and c to the
organizer. The loser of the rst-round auction receives b from the winner and also pays c
to the organizer. Consequently, the interest rate on the auction losers saving of $1 in the
Rosca is b  1  c while the winner of the date 1 auction borrows at a rate of b  1+ c. The
di¤erence between the borrowing and savings rate is 2c. In this way, by slightly abstracting
from the the specic rules that are used in practice in the Roscas in our sample, our model
allows to relate the winning bid directly to the implied interest rates. In addition, the
solution of the model is greatly simplied. Modelling two persons according to the actual
rules of our sample Roscas gives identical qualitative results.
No Arbitrage
We rst show that, in the absence of arbitrage, the interest rate di¤erence across locations is
given by di¤erences in average productivity, 1 2. More formally, an agents willingness
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to pay for the date 1 pot is found by equalizing her payo¤ from winning, 2p  b  c; to her
payo¤ from losing, b  c; which gives
b = p:
In a Rosca, two individuals of a location are randomly matched. In each Rosca, each
participant is uninformed about the other participants type, and hence willingness to pay.
We are thus in a situation of a symmetric, independent, private-value auction. Since the
Roscas we consider have open-ascending bid auctions, the appropriate bidding equilibrium
is most easily found by modelling the auction as a second-price sealed bid auction, which
is payo¤-equivalent. It can be shown that, in such an auction, each bidder determines her
bid by a strictly increasing function hi(p), where hi(p)  p for all p, hence there is some
overbidding relative to ones valuation of the pot. Denoting by Pi;k:2 the kth highest order
statistic of a sample of size two drawn from Fi, the di¤erence in interest rates between
branches, or spread for short, is
r = E[h1(P2:2)  h2(P2:2)]:
Under assumption A2, we have that h2(p) = h1(p)  (1 2): Denoting 1 2 by  we
then have that
r = :
When the e¢ ciency of allocations is concerned, the best possible outcome in this scenario
is that, in location i, all projects with a date 2 payo¤ greater than mi are nanced (i = 1; 2).
E¢ ciency, on the other hand, implies that all projects with a date 2 payo¤ greater than
m are nanced in each of the two locations. It follows immediately that the aggregate
allocation of capital will be ine¢ cient if  > 0:
Example with Uniform Distributions We consider uniform specications of F1 and















We will assume that the two distributions overlap su¢ ciently, specically
1   2  :
When all above-median projects are nanced in each location, the aggregate payo¤
at date 2 is
a =






because, in location i, the average payo¤ per doller invested is E[PijPi  mi] =
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dollars are invested in location i
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It can be shown, moreover, that each dollar which is moved from 2 to 1 earns an extra
return of =2 on average. The expected welfare di¤erenc between a fully e¢ ciencient
allocation of capital and autarky thus equals
















Insider Arbitrage, No entry
We next consider the case where the company can arbitrage across locations and has
monopoly power. We nd that interest rate di¤erences persist but they are smaller than
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inter-locational di¤erences in average productivity, 1 2. In the aggregate, the arbitrager
will borrow in the low productivity location and save in the high productivity location 
while preserving a spread in order to make prots.
The Rosca company has the choice to become a Rosca member herself in each of the
two locations at no cost. We consider the case where the companys agent enters one Rosca
with each private agent. We assume that the private agent knows of his co-participants
identity and that the companys agent plays a pure strategy in each location, i.e. she bids bi
in all Roscas in location i where the company becomes a member. When the private agent
in location i knows the company-agents bi, he will bid bi minus an increment whenever
p < bi and bi plus an increment when p > bi. In both of these cases, the auction price will
be roughly bi.
If the company holds one ticket in each of the branches, its expected prot is
c = b1(1  F1(b1)) + b2(1  F2(b2))  [b1F1(b1) + b2F2(b2)] (4)
Notice that (1 F1(b1)) is the expected number of period 1 pots that the company loses in
location 1, F1(b1) is the number of period 1 pots the company wins in location 1, each of
which generates a liability of b1 in the second period. Hence b1(1 F1(b1)) is the companys
expected income in the second period from the lost auctions in location 1 and b1F1(b1) the
liability from the won auctions in location 1.
To balance the budget in period one (in expectation), the company cannot lose more
period 1 pots than it wins,
F1(b1) + F2(b2)  (1  F1(b1)) + (1  F2(b2)): (5)
The company maximizes its prots by choice of b1 and b2 subject to (5).
Lemma 1 A strictly positive prot of the company implies that she chooses bids such that
1 > b1 > b2 > 2; (6)
which implies that the di¤erence in interest rates is greater than zero but smaller than
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the di¤erence in average productivity,
0 < r < :
Proof: It is convenient to rewrite the companys prot as
c = b1(1  2F1(b1)) + b2(1  2F2(b2)) (7)
and the budget-balance constraint as
F1(b1) + F2(b2)  1 (8)
We rst proof 1 > b1. To this end, suppose b1  1. This implies. We take
each of the following two cases in turn, (i) b2  2 and (ii) b2 > 2: Under (i)
1   2F1(b1)  0 and 1   2F2(b2)  0, which implies c  0. This contradicts
c > 0. Under (ii) 1   2F1(b1)  0; 1   2F2(b2) > 0, b2 > b1 and (8) implies that
1  2F2(b2)   (1  2F1(b1)). So we can write
c  b1 [(1  2F1(b1)) + (1  2F2(b2))]  b1 [(1  2F1(b1))  (1  2F2(b2))] = 0
Second we proof that b2 > 2. To this end, suppose b2  2. Based on the previous
result, it is su¢ cient to consider b1 < 1. In this case F1(b1) < 1=2 and F2(b2)  1=2,
which implies that F1(b1) + F2(b2) < 1. This contradicts (8).
Next we proof that b1 > b2. To this end suppose that b1  b2 and employ 1 > b1,
which implies F1(b1) < 1=2 and 1  2F1(b1) > 0; and b2 > 2, which implies F2(b2) >
1=2 and 1  2F2(b2) < 0. We may now write
c  b2 [(1  2F1(b1)) + (1  2F2(b2))]  2b2 [1  (F1(b1)  F2(b2))] = 0
where the last inequality follows from (8). But this contradicts c > 0: 
This lemma implies that (i) interest rates will vary across locations, (ii) the arbitragers
rank is positively correlated with the interest rate and (iii) - provided the constraint (8) is
binding - the average rank of the arbitrager is 0.5. The positive correlation between the local
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interest rate and the arbitragers rank follows from 1 > b1; which implies F1(b1) < 1=2;
and b2 > 2, which implies F2(b2) > 1=2: In other words, across locations, the arbitrager is
less likely to win the rst pot, the higher b:
The way the company intermediates between locations is through its di¤erent average
ranks in the two locations. In location i, the company wins the fraction Fi(bi) of rst period
pots and 1   Fi(bi) of second period pots. We say the rank of a Rosca member is zero is
she wins the rst pot and one if she wins the second pot. The companys average rank in
location i is 0Fi(bi) + 1(1  Fi(bi)) = 1  Fi(bi):
What about e¢ ciency? Compared to autarkic branches, in location 1 all projects with
a return between b1 and 1 are now nanced while an identical number of projects - with
return between 2 and b2 - is no longer nanced in location 2. On the other hand, this
allocation of capital still fails to be e¢ cient. Moreover, since the company and private
agents play a zero-sum game, the companys prots will be smaller than the e¢ ciency loss
due to the missallocation of capital. We hence have
Lemma 2 With insider arbitrage,
(i) the allocation of capital is not e¢ cient;
(ii) the allocation of capital is more e¢ cient than under autarky.
(iii) the arbitragers prot is strictly smaller than the loss due to the missallocation
of capital.
The following example illustrates these results:
Example with Uniform Distributions Notice that, for an e¢ cient allocation of funds
in this economy (which in the current setup implies an identical price of credit in the
two locations), an amount of n [1   =2  (2   =2)] = n(1   2) would have to







In general, the solution to the companys problem of maximizing (7) by choice of b1
and b2 subject to (8) can be charcterized by the two equations
g1(b1) = g2(b2); (9)
F1(b1) + F2(b2) = 1: (10)
For the uniform distributions considered here, this gives
b1 = 1  
1   2
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The amount which is transferred from location 2 to 1 in the rst period is the product
of the rank di¤erence and the number of memberships the company holds in each
location,




which is just half of the amount that would be transferred in an e¢ cient allocation of
funds across the two locations.


































The term bi+(i+=2)2 is the average payo¤ for one dollar invested in location i and
2n
 [(i + =2)  bi] the amount invested in location i. Simplifying gives






It can be shown that each dollar which is moved from location 2 to location 1 earns an
extra return of 78. The expected welfare di¤erenc between monopolisitc arbitrage
and autarky thus equals












Put di¤erently, we have that










Hence the di¤erence in welfare between a fully e¢ cient allocation of capital and mo-
nopolistic arbitrage is








The last equality follows from (2). Hence monopolistic arbitrage reduces the gap
between the aggregate payo¤s with full e¢ ciency and autarky (
2n
2 ) considerably,
by seven-eighths to be precise. The bulk of this additional surplus, four-eighths, is
captured by the arbitrager, while the remaining three-eighths accrue to the private
agents.
Costless Entry
We next consider a hypothetical case where there is costless entry into arbitrage. By
costless entry, we mean the absence of the participation fee c for an entering arbitrager.
16
Put di¤erently, if outsiders can arbitrage on the same terms as the insider (the company),
then we nd that interest rate di¤erences will disappear.
Suppose the company bids any pair (b1; b2), satisfying 2  b2 < b1  1. Then
an entrant can become a Rosca member in the two locations, bid b2 plus an increment in
location 2 and b1 minus an increment in location 1. The entrant will win for sure in location
2 at a price of b2 and lose for sure at a price of b1 in location 1. This will yield the entrant
a positive prot of b1   b2. When enough such entrants are active, the companys prots
will become negative because now the company wins too many auctions in location 1 and
loses too many in 2. The only equilibrium has b1 = b2, i.e. r = 0; and zero prots for the
compnay.
Note that if private agents in the two locations had access to a common nancial market
with a cost of intermediation equal to that in Roscas (i.e. 2c for a 1$ loan), then too such
interest rate di¤erences would disappear. Such a nancial market could, for example, be a
bank that operates branches with identical borrowing and savings rates in both locations,
where these two rates di¤er by precisely 2c.
Insider Arbitrage, Costly Entry
We consider the nal case where the company can arbitrage costlessly but entrants to
arbitrage must pay the cost c of Rosca membership. We nd that the di¤erences in interest
rates persist but are smaller than in the no-entry case when the di¤erence in productivity is
su¢ ciently large relative to the cost of entry (1 2 > 2c), and equal to the no-entry case
when the producitivity di¤erence is not su¢ ciently large (1   2  2c): More specically,
the di¤erence in interest rates is capped by max(1   2; 2c):
Suppose the company bids any pair (b1; b2), satisfying 2  b2 < b1  1. Then
an entrant can become a Rosca member in the two locations, bid b2 plus an increment in
location 2 and b1 minus an increment in location 1. The entrant will win for sure in location
2 at a price of b2 and lose for sure at a price of b1 in location 1. But now he faces a total
cost for the two memberships of 2c. So the entrant will make a prot of b1   b2   2c. This
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is positive only when b1   b2  2c. As a consequence, the company cannot sustain a higher
spread than 2c in equilibrium. When c is su¢ ciently large - relative to the di¤erence in
average productivity -, there will be no entrants and the outcome will be the same as with
monopolistic arbitrage and no entry.
We turn to the question of why arbitrage by outsiders (i.e. not the Rosca company)
may be costly in practice. First, the cost of arbitrage predicted by our model due to the
commission charged by the company will in practice equal 10% between the rst and last
round. For the sample Roscas, this amounts to comparing the interest rate over the entire
duration of a Rosca which is on average 30 months. So a necessary condition for an outsider
arbitrageur to make non-negative prots will be that the interst rate spread in months
between two locations where she participates is at least (roughly) 10=30 = 0:33%. There are,
however, two additional factors that complicate arbitrage by an entrant. First, whenever
the arbitrageur obtains an early pot she has to provide cosigners, which may cause a (non-
monetary) additional cost. Second, the arbitrageur faces uncertainty as he has to subscribe
to Roscas in certain branches upfront, i.e. when Roscas start. If locations experience
productivity shocks while Roscas are going on, however, the interest rate di¤erence between
two locations with an initially large spread may shrink and render the arbitrageurs prots
negative. To summarize this point, in our institutional setup we would expect only limited
scope for outside arbitrageurs unless interest rate di¤erences between locations substantially
exceed 0.33% per month for the majority of pairs of branches.
Testable Implications
The testable hypotheses arising from our theory so far are:
1. Interest rates do not di¤er across locations
2. (The monthly) interest rate spread across locations is bounded by 1=3% per month
across locations
3. Arbitragers rank across locations uncorrelated with interest rates across locations
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The testable hypotheses are summarized in the following table
Arbitrage
costless entry insider arbitrage, costly entry insider arbitrage, no entry
Interest Rate Variation zero positive, bounded positive
Correlation between r and rank n.a. positive positive
Variation: Cross-Arbitrage
We have so far only considered arbitrage between locations. It is entirely possible that
the company has access to investment opportunities or nancial markets that other Rosca
participants do not have access to. For instance, the arbitrager may have signicantly more
collateral than ordinary Rosca participants and may hence be able to borrow from commer-
cial banks or the Rosca company may have outside investment opportunities because she
is able to bundle funds and overcome indivisibilities. We consider this possibility within
our basic model. Suppose now that the company has access to a perfect capital market, i.e.
it can borrow/save a dollar and repay/earn R  1 dollars one period later. In this situation,
the company arbitrages not only between branches, but also between Roscas in general and
the outside capital market. In this scenario, which we term "cross arbitrage", all testable
implications continue to hold except for the companys average rank, which may now be
greater or smaller than one half (depending on whether R is closer to 1 or 2).




(b1  R)(1  2F1(b1)) + (b2  R)(1  2F2(b2)):
Notice that the term bi   R is the period two prot for each pot won in location i. The
solution can be characterized by the two equations
g1(b1) = g2(b2) = R: (14)
Notice that the rst equality is the same as in the situation of pure arbitrage; see (9). It
hence follows that for an appropriate value of R, R0 say, the two scenarios yield the same
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values of b1 and b2, and hence identical testable implications. However, in general the
previously derived implication "companys average rank equals one half" will not continue
to hold (whenever R 6= R0). Denoting the companys average rank by rk 2 [0; 1] (i.e. 0 for
winning early and 1 one for winning late pots only), recall that
rk = 1  F1(b1) + F2(b2)
2
:













As g0i(bi) will usually be positive (a su¢ cient condition is A1), this multiplier will usually
be negative. This is as expected: the higher the interest rate in the capital market, the
more likely is the company to be a net borrower in Roscas.
Example with Uniform Distributions
We consider the same uniform specications of F1 and F2 as in the previous example.





i.e. the companys bid is simply the average of the capital market interest rate and





i.e. the interest rate spread accross branches is precisely the same as with pure mo-
nopolistic arbitrage. So, at least in this example, access to a perfect capital market
does not a¤ect sptatial price fragmentation in Roscas.











i.e. for R = (1 + 2)=2, the rank is precisely one half (as with pure arbitrage), while
a larger R implies a higher (=later) average rank of the company.
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For the companys prots, we have
CM =
(1  R)2 + (2  R)2
2
:
It can be shown that CM = A i¤R = (1+2)=2 and CM > A i¤R 6= (1+2)=2
(more precisely, CM is convex in R and has its minimum at R = (1+2)=2). So the
company will in generally be better o¤ when it can combine inter-locational arbitrage
with arbitraging between Roscas and the capital market more broadly.
Testable Implications The following table summarizes the testable implications of in-
sider arbitrage and without access to an outside capital market.




r and companys rank positive positive positive
Companys avg. rank one half < 0:5 > 0:5
Correlation btw. observed (possibly) (possibly)
r and companys participation zero negative positive
Note that if the outside return for the company is relatively high it is less likely to
participate in Rosca locations where the interest rate is higher than average (and vice
versa).
Extending the Theory
The Roscas we have considered in the model are simplications of those observed in practice.
In particular, (i) bids in the observed auctions are distributed as dividends in the same
round, and not interest payments in later rounds and (ii) our sample Roscas have more
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than two rounds. Nonetheless, the testable implications derived for our simplied model
generalize to auctions that take the observed Rosca rules more literally (under certain
assumptions).
More specically, our model considers locations with di¤erences in aggregate productiv-
ity that are known before the Roscas commence and are observed by the company. One
might be concerned about situations where the di¤erences in productivity across locations
are not know ex-ante. In a world with multi-period Roscas, for instance, such uncertainty
may be even more of a concern. We imagine pure arbitrage occurs by taking positions in
several Roscas and then borrowing from those with interest rates lower than the expected
average for the entire economy and saving in those with interest rates higher than that
average. Further, the information requirements for cross arbitrage are reduced relative to
the pure arbitrage case considered above. With cross arbitrage, the arbitrageur simply
needs to bid according to her outside return; i.e. borrow when the implied borrowing rate
in the Rosca is lower than the outside return, and save otherwise. Note, however that we
have assumed that the arbitrageur is risk-neutral and indeed the theoretical results would
generalize with many risk-neutral arbitragers  but arbitrage in face of location-specic
uncertainty would be limited if the arbitrageurs were all risk averse.
4 Results
Financial Fragmentation
We rst explore the extent of fragmentation of interest rates accross space. Towards this
we estimate
rdij = ai + udij
by OLS, where d indexes denominations, i branches, and j Rosca groups of denomination d
in branch i. The interest rate r is computed for each Rosca in our sample according to (1).
The resulting branch means bai are plotted in gure 1, where a numerical branch identier
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is on the horizontal axis, and the (monthly) implied interest rate on the the vertical axis.
Figure 2 maps branch interest rates. Statistics of the distribution of the bais are set out in
Table 3, column 1. Accordingly, the coe¢ cient of variation is 0.099/0.76 = 0.13. From Fig-
ure 2, the 95% condence interval for this sample of branch averages is roughly [0:60; 1:00],
hence its width equals almost precisely four times the standard deviation. According to
Table 3, column 1, the hypothesis of equality of all ais is rejected at the 1% level.
Now we will control for the denomination of a Rosca and the date when a Rosca takes
place. This is important because a Rosca of a di¤erent denomination is a di¤erent nancial
product and the portfolio of Rosca denominations varies over branches. Moreover, even
when there is no di¤erence in interest rates over locations at any given point in time, this
interest rate may vary over time. Therefore we also control for the date at which a Rosca
was started. Our sample Roscas were started between January 2001 and October 2003. We
denote by quarterkdij a dummy variable which is equal to one for a Rosca that were started
in quarter k 2 f1; :::; 12g; where k = 1 covers the three months spell Januar to March 2001,
and zero otherwise. We estimate





dij + udij : (15)
Rather than reporting the point estimates of this regression, column 2 of table 3 reports
the properties of the estimated branch intercepts. Accordingly, the standard deviation is
reduced by only about 4 percent, from 0.099 to 0.095. The hypothesis of equal interest rates
accross branches is still clearly rejected. From this exercise, we conclude that the bulk of
spatial variation fails to be explained by di¤erences in Rosca denominations or Rosca dates.
It is also interesting to note that the correlation beteween the estimated branch interecepts
in columns 1 and 2 is 0.96.
Fragmentation: Borrower Risk, Collateral Requirements and Screening
The interest rate which we used as the dependent variable in the previous estimations is
a pure savings rate. However, de facto it is an increasing function in the winning bids of
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each rounds from 2 to n  1 in the Rosca. Hence it is also a kind of average of the price of
funds implicit in all loans made over the course of a Rosca. An important question hence is
whether spatial di¤erences in our interest rates are due to fundamentally di¤erent borrowing
conditions in local credit markets. Such di¤erences may arise from at least two sources.
On the demand side, borrowers may exhibit di¤erent risk characteristics with respect to
repayment. On the supply side, loan o¢ cersdecisions may di¤er across locations. Both
of these sources of spatial heterogeneity remain unobserved by the researcher, however.
Luckily, data on defaults collateral and screening by the lender are in our data set. We
can hence capture relevant non-monetary characteristics of loans by the default rate, the
number of cosigners required on a loan and the screening e¤ort of the lender. The latter
is captured by an indicator which equals one if the Rosca company veried occupation and
income of a borrower, and zero otherwise. Descriptive statistics of these three variables at
the Rosca level are set out in table 2. Accordingly, 4.78% of dues have not been repaid
by the time a Rosca ends, the company requires an average of 1.1 cosigners per loan and
veries the borrowers income 44% of the time.
Since we are interested in explaining cross-patial variation in interest rates (and not
intra-location variation in interest rates), we will not simply add realizations of the variables
at the Rosca level to estimation equation (15). Instead we shall separately calculate branch-
specic xed e¤ects for default rates and for loan terms (collateral, screening), and use these
branch-specic xed e¤ects to explain the spatial variation in interest rates. Note that if
we had simply added the Rosca default rates to estimation equation (15), we would then
confound the within-branch variation with the across-branch variation. From the theory
section, however, the within-branch variation in Rosca interest rates might simply be a
function of the small number of participants in each Rosca in a specic location and not
due to inherent di¤erences in returns to capital across locations.
Instead, we rst estimate equation (15) with each of the three risk measures as left hand
side variable in turn. This yields branch means net of time and denomination e¤ects. In
a second step, we use these estimated branch xed e¤ects as explanatory variables in a
24
regression with the estimated interest-rate branch intercepts from equation (15) as the left
hand side variable. This latter regression thus has 78 observations, one for each branch.
To start out, in table 4 we have set out some descriptive statistics of the estimated
branch xed e¤ects of three regressions (15) with default rate, number of cosigners, and
income verication as the left hand side variable, respectively. According to the resulting
coe¢ cients of variation, these risk measures exhibit substantially greater spatial variation
than the interest rate (where the CV is 0.13).
Column 1 of table 5 summarizes the results of a linear regression specication of the
interest rate branch xed e¤ects on the estimated xed e¤ects of the three loan character-
istics variables. Column 2 adds squared terms of the explanatory variables. According to
the results, only defaults are signicantly correlated with interest rates, where - as expected
in e.g. a Stiglitz-Weiss world - riskier borrowers have a higher willingness to pay for loans.
Column 3 of table 3 summarizes the distribution of the residuals from this regression. Ac-
cordingly, the standard deviation is reduced to 0.080 after controlling for the risk factors.
The null hypothesis of complete market integration - conditional on loan characteristics -
continues to be rejected, however.
The lower panel of that table gives p-values of tests for equal variances between pairs of
the three samples of estimated xed e¤ects (or residuals in the case of column 3). While the
di¤erence between the rst and the second, and the second and third specications are zero,
there is, at least at the 10 percent level, a signicant reduction in fragmentation between
the rst and third specication. Thus risk together with controls for denomination and time
signicantly explain about 20 percent of spatial di¤erences in interest rates as measured by
the standard deviation. The remaining 80% remain unexplained, however.
Arbitrage
We next test if there is systematic arbitrage between locations by the company: We measure
the rank (or position) of the winner of a pot on a 0 to 1 scale, where 0 represents a receipt
of the rst pot and 1 represents the receipt of the last pot. More precisely, we dene the
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where Td denotes the duration (in months) of denomination d. Descriptive statistics on the
companys participation at the Rosca level are set out in table 2. Accordingly, the company
holds about a third of all Rosca memberships and on average occupies a rank of 0.41, which
indicates that the company on average wins pots earlier than in the middle of a Rosca. These
same variables at the branch level are set out in table 4. According to the coe¢ cient of
variation, the companys activities exhibits spatial variation on a similar order of magnitude
as the interest rate. The mean rank of the company of .41 indicates that the company is
more interested in early than in late pots, and thus, within our theoretical framework, might
be arbitraging not only across branches but also against an outside investment opportunity
with a higher rate of return than the average in the Roscas. In all but three of the 77
branches, the institutional investors rank is below 0:5:
Prot maximizing arbitrage by the company (which reduces spatial variation in interest
rates without eliminating them) implies a positive correlation between the local interest rate
and the companys rank in the respective location. Using only pots won by the company,
we rst estimate




where t indexes the round in a Rosca, t = 2; :::; Td. Figure 3 plots the resulting branch
xed e¤ects bbi on the vertical axis against the estimated xed e¤ects of (15) in its original
version (with the interest rate as the dependent variable) on the horizontal axis. Clearly,
there is a positive relationship between these two variables. Hence,the institutional investor
takes relatively early pots (i.e. borrows) where interest rates are relatively low, and waits
to take later pots when interest rates are relatively high. We can also formally reject the
null hypothesis of no arbitrage by the company: the correlation coe¢ cient between the two
variables is 0.48 and signicantly bigger than zero at the one percent level. Column 3 of
table 5, moreover, shows that this positive correlation also holds conditional on other loan
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characteristics. The estimated coe¢ cient of 1.232 suggests that an increase in the companys
rank by one standard deviation (0.043) comes together with an interest rate that is 0.051
percentage points higher, more than half a (cross-branch) standard deviation of the interest
rate.
Barriers to Entry
So far we have argued that the results support the idea of a monopolist arbitrager (the
company) who intentionally preserves interest rate di¤erences between locations. The nat-
ural question that arises is how the company can keep out potential entrants into arbitrage.
Arbitrage is costly for potential entrants who have to pay the commission fee and provide
cosigners at the time of borrowing; while such costs are not borne by the company. In
this section, we briey discuss how the observed interest rate heterogeneity across space
is consistent with commission as a barrier to entry. According to the theory, competitive
costly arbitrage will drive down the interest wedge between any two locations to twice the
commission fee. As our sample Roscas have longer durations than those in the model, this
fee has to be scaled to a fee per month to make it comparable to the monthly interest
rates. Accordingly, the fee of 5% paid to the organizer by the winner of a Rosca auction
amounts to roughly 0.33% in interest rate terms per month. This is calculated as follows:
to arbitrage across any two Roscas requires an entrant to pay the commission twice, and
since the commission is paid for an average Rosca duration of 30 months, the per month
commission is 230 5%. An interest di¤erence of 0.33% between any two branches in ac-
cordance with competitive, albeit costly, arbitrage in this institutional setup. According to
table 3, column 1, the range of interest rates, 0:505; as well as the 95% condence band
with a width of about 0.40 is larger than 0:33. However, when we consider all possible
pairs of branches, 97% percent of pairs have a di¤erence not exceeding 0.33. The spatial
distribution of interest rates appears to be largely consistent with insider arbitrage with
costly entry, where the cost is about as large as the commission fee.
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Within-Branch Variation
We next compare interest rate variation across branches (which has been the focus of the
paper so far) with interest rate variation within a branch. Our theoretical model predicts
that there should be no interest-rate variation within a branch (in two-period Roscas)
because the insider arbitrager equates interest rates in all Roscas each location through its
bidding. But the observed Roscas range in length from 25 to 40 rounds and the company
only takes one-third of all positions on average, leaving considerable room for auctions in
which the company has no role. So we would expect considerable unexploited variation
within Roscas as well. To measure this, we estimate





dij + udij (16)
by OLS. The residuals of this regression capture exclusively deviations of Roscas of the
same denomination in the same branch started in the same quarter. The distribution of
the error terms will arguably be due to small sample variation in the composition of Rosca
groups in the same branch and idiosyncratic shocks occuring to Rosca participants which
the limited group size is not able to smooth fully. Hence the dispersion of the residuals from
this regression capture the local interest rate dispersion (and hence fragmentation within a
location) due to the fairly small scale of of intermediation in a Rosca - a feature uncommon
to bank lending, for example. Using the same sample of Roscas underlying the results
in table 3, estimation of (16) yields a regression standard error (which equals the standard
deviation of the residuals) of 0.146. The corresponding cross-branch standard deviation of
the interest rate of 0.095 (table 3, column 2) is roughly two thirds of this gure.
5 Conclusion
The principle of no-arbitrage, so crucial to economic reasoning, implies that risk-adjusted
interest rates should be equalized across nancial markets. We have presented evidence
to the contrary. The nancial markets we study are those organized in di¤erent towns
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in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The interest rates we analyze are determined
by local auctions. These interest rates accrue to savers who face an identical risk across
markets. What is remarkable about this variation in interest rates is that it persists despite
the presence of an inside arbitrager who borrows in low-interest locations and saves in
high-interest locations. We provide an explanation for why this arbitrager may deliberately
choose to maintain the interest rate spread at the cost of nancial e¢ ciency and discuss
entry barriers into arbitrage that enable such monopoly prots.
Our results raise questions about the competition between the organized (and regulated)
Roscas in our study and the commercial banking sector. One might expect then that the
variation in interest rates between nancial markets may depend partly on the presence of
bank branches in those locations. In ongoing research we are studying whether the presence
of bank branches reduces the nancial ine¢ ciencies across markets. Relatedly, it would be
useful to understand if the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s has promoted
more e¢ cient ow of nance across markets. By historically studying the evolution of
interest rates across Rosca locations we hope to provide an insight into this question.
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25 400 10,000 488 23.74
25 600 15,000 8 0.39
25 800 20,000 9 0.44
25 1,000 25,000 278 13.52
25 2,000 50,000 214 10.41
25 4,000 100,000 80 3.89
25 8,000 200,000 2 0.10
25 12,000 300,000 1 0.05
25 20,000 500,000 3 0.15
30 500 15,000 282 13.72
30 1,000 30,000 98 4.77
30 1,500 45,000 2 0.10
30 2,000 60,000 22 1.07
30 2,500 75,000 11 0.54
30 3,000 90,000 7 0.34
30 4,000 120,000 1 0.05
30 5,000 150,000 53 2.58
30 10,000 300,000 22 1.07
30 20,000 600,000 4 0.19
30 25,000 750,000 1 0.05
30 30,000 900,000 2 0.10
40 250 10,000 176 8.56
40 375 15,000 1 0.05
40 500 20,000 3 0.15
40 625 25,000 85 4.13
40 750 30,000 2 0.10
40 1,250 50,000 77 3.75
40 1,500 60,000 3 0.15
40 2,500 100,000 99 4.82
40 3,750 150,000 2 0.10
40 5,000 200,000 4 0.19
40 7,500 300,000 4 0.19
40 12,500 500,000 4 0.19
40 12,500 500,000 3 0.15
40 15,000 600,000 1 0.05
40 25,000 1,000,000 4 0.19
Sum 2056 100.00
Table!2.!Descriptive!Statistics,!Sample!Roscas
Mean Std.!Dev. Minimum Maximum
Duration!(months) 29.64 5.99 25.00 40.00
Contribution!(Rs./month) 1,468.12 2,462.76 250.00 30,000.00
Pot!(Rs.) 44,277.72 81,223.17 10,000.00 1,000,000.00
Date!of!first!auction August!30,!2002 181!(days) Jan!2,!2002 Sept!13,!2003
Monthly!Interest!Rate!(%) 0.74 0.22 0.00 1.59
Default!Rate!(%) 4.78 2.55 0.00 19.68
Cosigners 1.10 0.62 0.00 3.89
Income!Verification 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.97
Company!Participation 0.32 0.19 0.00 0.95







Standard!Dev. 0.099 0.095 0.080
Range 0.505 0.475 0.463







Mean Range Std Coeff.!of!Var.
Default!Rate!(%) 4.185 6.839 1.374 0.328
Cosigners 1.140 2.224 0.421 0.369
Income!Verification 0.455 0.758 0.191 0.420
Company!Participation 0.343 0.331 0.078 0.228








Intercept 0.666 *** 0.805 *** 0.418 ***
(0.045) (0.093) (0.091)








Screening "0.083 "0.122 "0.110







R"Squared 0.23 0.24 0.42
Number!of!observations 78 78 78
Notes:
all!explanatory!variables!are!estimated!branch!fixed!effects!
from!a!regression!of!the!explanatory!variable!on!branch!FEs!
denomination!and!time!dummies
Figure!1.!Distribution!of!Branch!Interest!Rates
Figure!2.!Map!of!Branch!Interest!Rates
Figure!3.!Scatter!Plot!of!Company's!Rank!and!Local!Interest!Rates
Figure!4.!Scatter!Plot!of!Company's!Participation!and!Local!Interest!Rates
